



Reforms and economic growth in transition
economies: Complementarity, sequencing
and speed
2003  •  No. 1
Bank of  Finland
Institute for Economies in TransitionMr Timo Harell, editor
Press monitoring
Timo.Harell@bof.fi













Ms Liisa Sipola, information specialist
Information retrieval




Mr Pekka Sutela, head
Russian economy and economic policy








Phone: +358 9 183 2268
Fax: +358 9 183 2294
E-mail: bofit@bof.fi
Internet: www.bof.fi/bofit
BOFIT  personnel 2003
Ms Seija Lainela, economist
Russian economy and economic policy
Seija.Lainela@bof.fi
Mr Jouko Rautava, economist
Russian economy and economic policy
Jouko.Rautava@bof.fi
Mr  Jian-Guang Shen, economist
Chinese economy and economic policy
Financial crises
Jian-Guang.Shen@bof.fi




Ms Merja Tekoniemi, economist
Russian economy and economic policy
Merja.Tekoniemi@bof.fi
Ms Tuuli Koivu, economist
Baltic economies
Tuuli.Koivu@bof.fi





Mr Iikka Korhonen, research supervisor
Baltic economies
Issues related to the EU enlargement
Iikka.Korhonen@bof.fi
Mr Vesa Korhonen, economist
Russia’s international economic relations
Russia’s banking system
Issues related to the EU enlargement
Vesa.Korhonen@bof.fi
Discussion Papers
2003  •  No. 1
Bank of  Finland
Institute for Economies in Transition
Karsten Staehr
Reforms and economic growth in transition
economies: Complementarity, sequencing
and speedBOFIT  Discussion Papers
Editor-in-Chief Iikka Korhonen
BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
Karsten Staehr:
Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:













2 Growth regressions for transition economies.................................................................8
3 Estimation model and data...........................................................................................11
4 Correlated reforms and principal components.............................................................14
5 Reforms and economic growth ....................................................................................17
6 Speed of reforms..........................................................................................................23
7 Final comments............................................................................................................27Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
4
All opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Bank of Finland.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
5
Karsten Staehr *
Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
Abstract
Growth regressions have provided important insights into the impact of economic reforms
on growth in transition economies. Using principal components to decompose reform vari-
ables and construct reform clusters, we address unsettled issues such as the importance of
sequencing and reform speed. The results indicate a broad-based reform policy is good for
growth, but so is a policy of liberalisation and small-scale privatisation without structural
reforms. Conversely, large-scale privatisation without adjoining reforms, market opening
without supporting reforms and bank liberalisation without enterprise restructuring affect
growth negatively. Swift reform policies allow transition countries to benefit from higher
growth for a longer period of time. The speed of reforms otherwise appears to have only
limited effects on short-term and medium-term growth.
 Economic reforms, growth, principal components, gradualism versus big-bang
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Karsten Staehr
Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
Tiivistelmä
Kasvuregressiot ovat antaneet tärkeää tietoa taloudellisten uudistusten vaikutuksesta talo-
uskasvuun siirtymätalouksissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa reformeja kuvaavat indikaattorit de-
komponoidaan pääkomponenttianalyysin avulla. Saatujen tulosten avulla voidaan tutkia
uudistusten järjestyksen ja nopeuden vaikutusta talouskasvuun. Tulokset osoittavat, että
laajat uudistukset auttavat talouskasvua,  joskin samanlainen vaikutus on myös pelkällä
talouden vapauttamisella ja pienten yritysten yksityistämisellä ilman syvempiä rakenne-
muutoksia. Suurten yritysten yksityistäminen ja markkinoiden avaaminen ulkomaiselle
kilpailulle ilman muita uudistuksia sekä pankkitoiminnan vapauttaminen ilman yritysuu-
distuksia haittaavat kasvua. Nopeiden uudistusten ansiosta siirtymätaloudet voivat nauttia
ripeästä talouskasvusta kauemmin. Uudistusten nopeudella ei sinänsä näytä olevan vaiku-
tusta talouskasvuun lyhyellä tai keskipitkällä aikavälillä.
Asiasanat: taloudelliset uudistukset, kasvu, pääkomponenttianalyysi, gradualismiBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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1  Introduction
The defining theme in transition economics is Adam Smith’s centuries old question: How
do countries get rich? At the start of reforms in the early 1990s, the most important policy
objective in the transition countries arguably was raising living standards by boosting eco-
nomic growth. The debate over the choice of reform strategy was subsequently fuelled by
the deep production falls experienced in almost every transition economy. Adam Smith’s
question today remains at centre stage as the discussion of which reform strategy is most
likely to bring about economic growth continues.
Case studies provide valuable insights into the impact of reforms on growth and other
variables of interest.
1 They allow a detailed analysis of reforms, taking into account politi-
cal and socio-economic factors. Unfortunately, case studies do not necessarily produce
results that can be broadly generalised and their conclusions may be influenced unduly by
recent experience.
2
The most important approach to analysing the effects of reforms on growth is cross-
section or panel data estimations, explaining growth by variables reflecting economic re-
forms while controlling for other factors. The first contributions, appearing in the mid-
1990s, were the starting point for an extensive body of literature. Nevertheless, a number
of issues related to the choice of reform strategy and its impact on growth remain largely
unresolved, in particular:
•  What is the relative importance of individual reform elements?
•  Can different reform elements substitute for each other or are some reforms comple-
mentary in the sense that their implementation has to be synchronised or sequenced to
obtain favourable growth results?
•  How rapidly should reforms be implemented?
The lack of firm empirical evidence on these questions is unfortunate as they could help in
ascertaining the relative success of various reform strategies. Policymakers in all transition
countries continue to face sequencing and speed issues when designing reform packages,
see Nsouli  (2002).
These questions also recur at the international level in the occasionally heated debate
on reform strategy, e.g. World Bank (1996) and Stiglitz (2001).
3 Two camps have
                                                
1 See Campos & Coricelli (2002) footnote 47 for a listing of case studies considering the impact of reforms
on growth and other economic variables. IMF 	

 and the OECD 
	
routinely discuss country performance in the light of reforms undertaken and point out areas of “unfinished
reforms” that may impede growth.
2 The assessment of large-scale voucher privatisation in the Czech Republic illustrates this point. The method
was initially considered highly successful as the Czech economy boomed in the mid-1990s, but later
discredited following the country’s poor performance in the late 1990s.
3 Wolf (1999) and Roland (2001) survey the debate, the latter with an emphasis on political economy
arguments. See also IMF (2000) for an overview and references. The debate is based on different assessments
of how both transition and market economies function. The approaches have divergent views on the political
economy of reform, in particular the conditions for maintaining reform momentum. There are also different
perspectives on the amount of uncertainty linked to reforms and how to manage this uncertainty. It isKarsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
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emerged. One camp – under labels like “big-bang”, “cold turkey” or “market fundamen-
talism” – favours rapid and comprehensive reforms. Their basic premise is that reforms
should progress as fast and on as many fronts as possible because various reform elements
can (at least, to some extent) substitute for each other. The other camp – under labels like
“gradualism” or “evolutionary-institutionalist perspective” emphasises timing and se-
quencing of specific reforms and tends to favour slower implementation of reforms. They
see complementarities between specific sets of reforms as important, so reforms must be
sequenced, i.e. certain reforms are prerequisites to further reforms.
We seek, within the framework of growth regressions, to make progress on the three
contentious issues listed above.
4 The paper makes a number of contributions to the litera-
ture. First, we apply principal component analysis on (stacked) reform indices to identify
“reform clusters”. This allows a deeper discussion of the overall design of reform programs
in transition economies. Second, we address inference problems stemming from the corre-
lation of many reform variables. This facilitates identification of which reforms are most
important for economic growth. Third, we use estimation with reform clusters as right-
hand side variables to reveal complementarities between reform elements. This provides
insight into the reform sequencing issue. Fourth, the impact of speed is addressed in some
detail. Several direct tests are devised and applied.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature of growth estima-
tions for transition economies. Section 3 discusses selection of an econometric model and
variables. Section 4 analyses the correlation pattern of reform variables and derives reform
clusters. Section 5 estimates the impact of reform clusters and control variables on growth.
Section 6 tests how reform speed impacts growth. Section 7 concludes.
2  Growth regressions for transition economies
The literature on growth regressions for transition economies seeks to explain growth by
miscellaneous variables that reflect e.g. economic reforms, initial conditions or economic
shocks. A diverse range of variables reflecting factors of interest has been employed for
right-hand side variables, while variables accounting for accumulation of human and
physical capital are typically omitted.
5 This approach owes its intellectual debt to the “new
growth” literature of the 1990s (Havrylyshyn , 1998).
Fischer  (1996a) initiated the literature. Their analysis used a panel of annual data
1992-94 for 25 transition economies. Monetary stabilisation as captured by budget balance
and an exchange rate regime dummy were positively linked with growth.
6 Transition re-
forms were measured by a “cumulative liberalisation index”, which weighted scores for
price liberalisation, trade liberalisation, privatisation and banking reform, each year calcu-
                                                                                                                                                   
essentially an empirical problem to evaluate which reform strategy – including choice of specific reforms,
sequencing and speed – yields the best results.
4 Note that the discussion on reform strategy raises many issues besides growth effects. These include
distribution, political consolidation and long-term sustainability.
5 Wacziarg (2002, p. 907) characterises the methodology as “…a now well-established tradition of throwing
every variable under the sun into the kitchen sink of growth regressions.”
6 Fischer   (1996a) argue that monetary stabilisation is a “prerequisite” for growth in transition
economies. It is difficult to see how they arrive at this conclusion as the variables for monetary stabilisation
enter 

 in their estimations.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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lated by accumulating the scores for all previous years of reform.
7 The cumulative liberali-
sation index also proved beneficial to growth.
Fischer  (1996a) has been succeeded by a host of papers estimating growth re-
gressions for transition economies. The papers are too numerous to cite, but survey papers
have recently synthesised the literature. Havrylyshyn (2001) focuses entirely on growth
regressions while Fischer & Sahay (2000), Campos & Coricelli (2002) and World Bank
(2002) frame the results from regression analyses in broader discussions.
8 The survey pa-
pers generally agree on the following:
•  Nearly all papers confirm the main findings in Fischer  (1996a). Monetary stabili-
sation and reforms that change the structure of the economy are positively correlated
with growth. Some studies find an immediate negative effect of liberalisation and
structural reforms, while others do not. Reform’s negative short-term effect may be in-
terpreted as the result of “creative destruction” or “disorganisation.”
•  All transition economies experiences an initial steep fall in production, even those un-
dertaking very limited reforms. Thus, reforms alone do not explain the output drop.
Notably, the 
 of the fall was likely influenced by the policies chosen.
•  Traditional factor analysis plays no role in explaining growth in transition economies.
A possible explanation is that the reorganisation of the planned economy inherently
leads to efficiency shifts and hence affects growth without changes in measured factor
use.
•  Initial conditions, e.g. the structure and the economic development of the planned
economy, impact growth. The importance of initial conditions, however, is limited and
diminishes over time.
These findings have generally been confirmed by studies employing different samples,
control variables and econometric methods (Havrylyshyn, 2001).
9The results appear ro-
bust and the literature has successfully framed the debate on reforms among academics and
policymakers (e.g. World Bank, 1996). However, a number of important issues remain
unresolved, including the importance of: (i) specific reform elements, (ii) the sequencing
and complementarity of reform elements, and (iii) the speed at which reforms should be
implemented.
(i): There is little research on the relative importance of 

 of reforms.
Many studies use the sum or average of various reform indices and show that this measure
is correlated with growth. Other studies employ a tiny set of variables and stress the im-
portance of one or a few factors on growth. Havrylyshyn  (1998) consider the impor-
tance of specific reform elements. They find that generally an aggregate index performs
best whereas parameters to individual reform elements are estimated very imprecisely.
                                                
7 This method of accumulating the scores implies that even if there is no change in reforms from a certain
year, the cumulative liberalisation will still increase year after year.
8 Havrylyshyn(2001) tabulates many of the studies, their empirical methods and the main results.
9 A recent study has questioned this conclusion. Radulescu & Barlow (2002) employ specific modelling and
extreme bounds analysis and find a stable relationship between inflation stabilisation and growth, but not
between transition reforms and growth. The applicability of their analysis is, however, limited as many of
their right-hand side variables are highly correlated. Multicollinearity implies that sequential elimination of
explanatory variables and extreme bounds analyses are unreliable and elimination tests have low power.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
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Berg  (1999) also test for the impact of specific reform elements, obtaining inconclu-
sive results dependent on the specification of the regression model.
Only a few studies succeed in pinpointing specific reforms important in promoting
growth. The main reason is that the individual reform indices are generally highly corre-
lated. Countries that liberalise quickly typically also proceed with privatisation and struc-
tural reforms. Multicollinearity leads to imprecisely estimated parameters, and exclusion of
an insignificant reform index can change the sign of other parameter estimates. The prob-
lem is aggravated by poor data quality, little 	
	
 theoretical guidance and possible
changes in the growth process during transition.
(ii) The importance of sequencing and complementarity has stirred much controversy.











		” (source’s italics). The phrase “institutional reforms” should here be interpreted as
all changes to the institutional structure of the economy, e.g. the dismantling of the plan-
ning system (liberalisation), the transfer of property rights (privatisation) and the creation
of new institutions (structural reforms).
Most studies yield limited insights into these issues. The sum or average of various re-
form indices used in many studies implies perfect substitutability of reforms, i.e. lagging
reforms in one area can be fully counterbalanced by faster reforms in other areas (Correa,
2002). Studies that focus on one or a few variables implicitly assert these few variables are
indispensable and implicitly assume perfect complementarity.
A few studies directly address the issue of reform complementarity and sequencing.
Havrylyshyn  (1998) find that the aggregate reform index generally is more important
than any specific element. Also, when substituting the aggregate index with its three re-
form components, the fit deteriorates. This could be interpreted as an indication that the
overall reform package is what matters for growth, i.e. reforms are complementary and in
this sense sequencing matters. Zinnes  (2001) include an interaction term between a
privatisation variable and a variable that captures corporate sector reforms. They find that,
while privatisation alone has no effect on growth, privatisation combined with corporate
reforms has a positive impact.
(iii) The impact of the speed at which reforms are implemented is an issue, which re-
mains largely unresolved. Havrylyshyn (2001, p. 80) states with reference to the debate on




italics). Only a limited number of papers seek to test 
	 whether the speed of reform
implementation has an effect on economic performance.
Most studies find that that the level of reforms impacts growth positively. From this
follows trivially that speedy reform is advantageous, since the country will benefit from
higher growth from an early stage. This inference, however, says little about the impact of
the  with which reforms are . Also, we would generally be interested in ef-
fects of speedy reform 	 this level effect.
Other papers, e.g. de Melo  (1997), employ the cumulative liberalisation index
used in Fischer  (1996a) and argue that a positive and significant parameter estimate
indicates that speedy reforms are beneficial. Per construction, the cumulative liberalisation
index captures the current level of reform in addition to the sum of previous reform levels.
The sum of previous reforms contains information about the extent of previous reforms
undertaken earlier, but is a very imperfect indicator of the speed at which reforms are im-Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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plemented.
10 Besides, the use of the cumulative liberalisation index does not allow a sepa-
ration of the effects of the reform level and earlier reforms.
Berg  (1999) seek to remedy the latter problem by including separate terms for
the initial reform level, for the current reform level, and for a weighted sum of lagged re-
form levels. They find that the parameter to the weighted sum of lagged reforms is signifi-
cant and positive, and take this as a sign that there are extra benefits of (early) reforms.
However, as also discussed in Berg  (1999), the discounted sum of reforms is at best a
rather indirect measure of the speed of reforms.
Heybey & Murell (1999) find that the speed of reforms has no effect on growth when
one controls for endogeneity by taking into account the effect of growth on reforms. The
results are derived in a cross-country estimation with few observations, and the choice of
instrument variables can be questioned. They use the change of reforms as a proxy for the
speed of reforms. It is, as argued above, a very indirect measure of speed.
Wolf (1999) divides transition countries into three groups (radical reformers, gradual
reformers and lagging reformers), based on reform progress at the early stages of transi-
tion. He shows that a dummy, which is equal to 1 for the countries belonging to the group
of fast reformers, is insignificant when controlling for the reform level.
These mostly indirect tests of speed effects and their inconclusive results stem from
two complications. First, it is difficult to construct testable hypotheses for an often vaguely
defined concept of reform speed. Second, empirical implementation is difficult because of
the problem of devising well-specified growth regressions from the few available observa-
tions.
In sum, a number of issues related to the growth effects of reforms in transition
economies are still debated, in particular, the impact of specific reforms, the importance of
sequencing and complementarity and the effect of reform speed. The inconclusive results
are partly the consequence of econometric difficulties stemming from specification prob-
lems and highly correlated data series.
3  Estimation model and data
"

Econometric modelling of the link between reforms and economic performance inevitably
appears simplistic in the light of the complexities of the transition process. Figure 1 pres-
ents a stylised model of the factors determining economic performance. Initial conditions
can impact economic performance directly, but might also influence the choice of reforms
and vulnerability to exogenous shocks. The choice of economic reforms influences eco-
nomic performance, but there might also be a feedback from performance to reforms,
whereby the reforms impact the prevalence and seriousness of various shocks. Sachs 
(2000) and Campos & Coricelli (2002) give broader discussions of the factors influencing
the growth process in transition countries.
                                                
10 A country starting reforms with a reform level equal to 2 but not undertaking any reforms will after three
years have a cumulative liberalisation index of 6. A country having a reform level equal 0 in the first year, 2
in the second year and 4 in the third year, would also have a cumulative liberalisation index of 6 after three
years.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
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Figure 1.   A stylised model of economic performance
In general, one cannot expect to model all factors determining economic performance, in-
cluding the endogeneity of policy formation and shock vulnerability. The main focus of
this study is the effect of reforms on growth. Consequently, we consider a one-equation
reduced-form panel regression with the growth rate on the left-hand side and various ex-
planatory variables on the right-hand side. The right-hand variables include reform vari-
ables, shocks and initial conditions.
To keep complexities at bay, we choose not to explicitly model the policy formation
process. Economic reform indices are generally treated as weakly exogenous and entered
on the right-hand side of the growth regressions. Thus, we grant that economic perform-
ance can impact the desirability of various economic reforms, but follow the view of Berg
 (1999) argue that policymakers ultimately decide which reforms to implement.
Initial conditions in transition countries varied tremendously. Uzbekistan emerged
from the Soviet Union as a mainly agricultural country with disrupted trade links. Hun-
gary, in contrast, has industrialised and even implemented some market-oriented reforms.
We generally expect initial conditions to be country specific so that the effect of initial
conditions can be soaked up with fixed-effect dummies. However, we also perform regres-
sions with variables reflecting initial conditions.
The only control employed for exogenous shocks is a war dummy. It is mainly intro-
duced to ensure that the numerically huge negative growth rates experienced in a number
of CIS and Balkan countries during war and civil unrest do not lead to extreme outliers that
unduly impact results. Havrylyshyn (2001) concludes in his survey that controls for shocks
and initial conditions generally have little impact on his results.
The choice of specific reform variables to be included on the right-hand side is diffi-
cult. We focus on eight reform indices assembled by the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD). Together with a variable reflecting nominal stability, these
variables broadly cover the four main ingredients of reforms: liberalisation, stabilisation,
privatisation and structural reforms. Further, the EBRD indices are available for the period
1989-2001, which permits a long estimation sample.
A host of other variables have been included in growth regressions for transition
countries, e.g. measures capturing the institutional environment, governance and govern-
ment ability, legal protection and social capital. As elsewhere in the “new growth” litera-
ture, it is relatively easy to find theoretical arguments for including almost any variable.
Having only a limited number of data points, one is forced to make difficult – and some-
what arbitrary – decisions on which variables to include and exclude.
We focus on reform policies of a rather specific character. The EBRD indices are
“established” in the literature, allow a long sample and are all collected by the same
source. By omitting broader-based measures of transitional readiness, we avoid complex
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ables are closely related and might to some extent be captured in the EBRD indices. For
example, Ahrens & Meurers (forthcoming) show that measures of governance quality are
likely to impact economic outcome only via their impact on economic policies.
Havrylyshyn & van Rooden (2000) show that nearly all of a large number of institutional
indicators are strongly correlated with the EBRD indices.
#
The data set consists of annual data for 25 transition economies from 1989 to 2001. As in
most other studies, the Asian transition countries (Mongolia, Vietnam and China) are not
included in the data set. The data for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are also ex-
cluded. Experimentation shows that including the two latter countries would have little
impact on results.
The left-hand side variable, G, is the growth rate of the gross domestic product, ex-
pressed as per cent per year. The EBRD data source (various issues) relies on official sta-
tistics, so data quality problems imply that output growth at the beginning of the transition
is probably underestimated as new private sector activities are only partly covered.
The right-hand side variables include consumer price inflation, I, measured as the an-
nual percentage change of average consumer prices. EBRD (various issues) figures are
used. The inflation rate can be interpreted as a measure of monetary stability and a function
of stabilisation policies. Data for inflation are missing for 1989-90 for countries that were
still part of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. To achieve a balanced sample, these missing
values are replaced with the inflation figures for the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia as appro-
priate. This replacement has no material effect on the results. To avoid extreme inflation
rate observations that impact the results inappropriately, the logarithmic transformation LI
= log(100+I) is used.
Several transition economies have been exposed to civil unrest or international con-
flicts. The dummy, WAR, is equal to 1 for each year the country is engulfed in a serious
domestic or international conflict. If the country is at peace, a value of 0 is used.
11
We control for initial conditions in certain regressions. Experimentation with individ-
ual country characteristics such as 1989 income level or the number of years under com-
munism was unsuccessful as the variables were generally insignificant. We have instead
chosen to control for initial conditions with two composite variables constructed by de
Melo  (2001). INI1 captures the degree of macroeconomic distortions and unfamiliar-
ity with market processes in society. INI2 measures overall economic development in
terms of industrialisation (and possible over-industrialisation), pre-reform GDP and degree
of urbanisation. Note that INI1 and INI2 are not dated variables.
The right-hand variables of most importance to this study are indices measuring re-
form intensity. We have chosen to focus on the following indices constructed by the Euro-
pean Bank of Reconstruction and Development:
BRIRL –    Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation
CP –    Competition policy
GER –    Governance and enterprise restructuring
LSP –  Large-scale  privatisation
PL – Price liberalisation
SMNB – Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions
                                                
11 The dummy is constructed using information from these web pages: www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/,
www.onwar.com/aced/index.htm and www.alertnet.org/thefacts/countryprofiles/.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
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SSP –     Small-scale privatisation
TFES – Trade and foreign exchange system








 indices measuring the transfer of production facilities to private owners. The indices
ignore the specific privatisation methods used. The remaining four indices relate to 	
		
 and institution building. BRIRL and SMNB measure the emergence of finan-
cial markets and the efficiency of financial intermediation. GER refers to the governance
structure of the firms and the degree of restructuring, in principle of private as well as
state-owned firms. Finally, CP measures the legislation and enforcement aimed at limiting
misuse of monopolist power.
12 See EBRD (2001, chapter 2) for a further discussion of the
indices.
The indices are compiled from expert assessments of EBRD staff. An index score
equal to 1 indicates no reform relative of a “standard” planned economy, while the maxi-
mum score 4.3 corresponds to a well-functioning market economy. The indices were re-
cently backdated to 1989 (see EBRD, 2000, p. 31). Thus, data for the eight EBRD indices
are available for the entire transition period 1989-2001.
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4  Correlated reforms and principal components
We employ a large set of variables to account for economic growth in 25 transition
economies: the eight EBRD indices, logarithmic inflation, the conflict dummy and two
variables capturing initial conditions. Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for the ten dated
variables (i.e. excluding initial conditions) stacked for all 25 countries.
Table 1. Matrix of correlation coefficients for stacked variables
   
      

 10 . 3 3 –0.50 –0.32 –0.51 –0.45 –0.13 –0.37 –0.38 –0.44
 0.33 1 –0.27 –0.30 –0.30 –0.31 –0.18 –0.27 –0.26 –0.28
 –0.27 –0.50 1 0.71 0.92 0.84 0.67 0.78 0.83 0.86
 –0.30 –0.32 0.71 1 0.78 0.74 0.57 0.78 0.68 0.63

 –0.30 –0.51 0.92 0.78 1 0.86 0.65 0.80 0.82 0.82
 –0.31 –0.45 0.84 0.74 0.86 1 0.67 0.75 0.84 0.80
 –0.18 –0.13 0.67 0.57 0.65 0.67 1 0.53 0.79 0.80
 –0.27 –0.37 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.75 0.53 1 0.70 0.66
 –0.26 –0.38 0.83 0.68 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.70 1 0.87
 
 –0.28 –0.44 0.86 0.63 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.66 0.87 1
A distinct correlation pattern is apparent. The conflict dummy is positively correlated with
logarithmic inflation and negatively with all eight EBRD indices. Inflation is negatively
correlated with all eight EBRD indices indicating that the degree of monetary stabilisation
is positively correlated with the other reform indices. Most strikingly, all eight EBRD indi-
                                                
12 The eight EBRD indices are conceptually diverse, e.g. PL and CP measure specific steps, while GER and
the financial sector indices are quite broad.
13 The EBRD kindly supplied country-specific variables for the period 1989-90, although they have yet to be
published.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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ces are positively and very strongly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficients
lie, with few exceptions, within the interval 0.7-0.8.
The extent of correlation between the EBRD indices is problematic. Multicollinearity
can lead to erroneous inference (see Havrylyshyn, 2001).
14 It leads to imprecisely esti-
mated parameters in growth regressions and makes it difficult to separate out the effects of
various reforms as tests for exclusion of variables have low power. A number of studies
include an extra variable together with an overall reform variable. The new variable turns
out to be highly significant, while the overall reform variable becomes insignificant, and,
in some cases, the parameter changes sign. While one might conclude that the original re-
form variable has no impact on growth, this conclusion may well be erroneous in the pres-
ence of multicollinearity.
We tackle the multicollinearity problem employing the principal components method,
which generates new variables (principal components) as linear combinations of the origi-
nal variables. The weights of the linear combinations (factor loadings) are chosen so that
the new principal components are uncorrelated and so that the first principal component
explains as much of the original variation as possible, the second principal component ex-
plains as much as possible of the remaining variation, etc.
15 In addition to addressing the
multicollinearity problem, the method also helps specify the structure of the reform indi-
ces.
We have chosen to calculate the principal components only for the eight EBRD indi-
ces. This choice is based on three considerations. First, LI and WAR are not well corre-
lated with the EBRD indices. Second, the resulting principal components are easier to in-
terpret when LI and WAR are excluded. Third, the variables are primarily included as
control variables as the importance of both variables is firmly established in the literature.
We find the principal components from the stacked reform indices, where all coun-
tries’ index values are stacked consecutively. This implies that the observations for all
years weight evenly when the variance-covariance matrix (and hence, the principal com-
ponents) are calculated. Ahrens & Meurers (forthcoming) also apply factor analysis to
stacked right-hand variables. Their purpose, method and data set differ significantly from
ours, however. Sachs  (2000) apply a clustering method and de Melo  (2001)
principal components, but only on data for initial conditions. Havrylyshyn & van Rooden
(2000) use the principal components method on reform data for a single year.
                                                
14 The multicollinearity problem was already acknowledged in Fischer  (1996b). Havrylyshyn & van
Rooden (2000) provide examples of the consequences of multicollinearity in growth regressions.
15 In technical terms the factor loadings used to calculate the uncorrelated principal components are found
from an orthogonalising transformation of the sample correlation matrix. The eigenvalues from the
orthogonalisation reflect the share of total variation explained by each principal component.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
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Table 2. Principal components of eight policy reform variables
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-- 0.795 0.079 0.040 0.026 0.022 0.016 0.014 0.008
Loadings:
 0.37 –0.05 –0.42 0.08 0.38 0.09 –0.19 0.70
 0.33 –0.44 0.63 –0.38 0.28 –0.21 0.13 0.13

 0.37 –0.16 –0.28 –0.13 0.35 0.15 –0.37 –0.68
 0.37 –0.05 –0.16 –0.49 –0.59 0.46 0.18 0.07
 0.32 0.59 0.53 0.23 0.08 0.41 –0.19 0.01
 0.34 –0.49 0.07 0.73 –0.32 0.05 0.09 –0.06
 0.37 0.26 –0.03 –0.07 –0.40 –0.69 –0.40 0.02
 
 0.36 0.34 –0.20 0.08 0.21 –0.24 0.76 –0.17
The result of the principal components analysis on the stacked EBRD indices is reported in
Table 2. The principal components are labelled PC1, PC2,…, PC8. The upper panel shows
the eigenvalues from the orthogonalisation of the sample correlation matrix and how much
each principal component explains of the total variance of the primary EBRD indices
(found as the eigenvalue of each principal component divided by the sum of eigenvalues).
The lower panel shows the factor loadings used as weights to calculate the principal com-
ponents as linear combinations of the original indices.
The principal components reveal clusters of reform policies. Some of the principal
components have straightforward interpretations, while others have less intuitive rendi-
tions. In any case, the growth estimations in the next section reveal that only the following
five principal components enter significantly, i.e.
•  PC1 is broadly the sum of the eight reform indices, divided by 3. The variable can be
interpreted as broad-based reforms including liberalisation, privatisation and structural
measures. PC1 captures 79.5% of total variation in the initial eight reform variables
and, hence, it is not without merit that many studies use an overall reform variable
simply calculated as the sum of the EBRD reform indices. We refer to PC1 as “broad-
based reforms.”
•  PC2 has positive factor loadings for price liberalisation, market opening and small-
scale privatisation. It has negative loadings for the rest of the EBRD indices, including
the numerically large loadings for security markets and competition policy. PC2 cap-
tures what is sometimes called “early reforms” or “initial phase reforms” (EBRD
(2002)), i.e. liberalisation and small-scale privatisation $

	
			. PC2 is synonymous with “liberalisation.”
•  PC6 has large positive loadings for large-scale privatisation and price liberalisation and
a numerically large negative loading for small-scale privatisation, i.e. a large PC6 indi-
cates a large extent of large-scale privatisation 	
 small-scale privatisation. PC6
will be referred to as “large-scale privatisation”, but the principal component could just
as well be defined as “lack of small-scale privatisation.”
•  PC7 is marginally significant in most of the growth regressions. PC7 has large positive
factors loading for market opening and substantial negative loadings for small-scale
privatisation and enterprise restructuring as PC7 captures an early market openingBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
17
without privatisation or restructuring of production. PC7 is referred to as “early market
opening.”
•  PC8 has a large positive loading for banking reforms and interest rate liberalisation, but
a large negative loading for enterprise restructuring. PC8 captures a mismatch between
banking and enterprise reforms and is referred to as “early bank liberalisation.”
The use of principal components reveals a particular structure of the reform policies un-
dertaken in transition economies. The reform cluster PC1, where liberalisation, privatisa-
tion and structural reforms are closely synchronised, captures 79.5% of the variation in the
EBRD reform indices. This high share of variation is explained by the fact that all loadings
are positive so PC1 retains the same trend as the underlying EBRD indices.
The remaining 20.5% of variation is explained by PC2, …, PC8. These principal
components denote clusters where liberalisation, privatisation and structural reforms do not
go hand-in-hand. They are examples of combinations of “unsynchronised reforms.”
16 This
turns out to be useful when exploring the issues of reform complementarity. For example,
PC2 allows us to isolate the effect of liberalisation and small-scale privatisation when no
other reforms are pursued. Similarly, PC3, …, PC8 represent different clusters of unsyn-
chronised reforms and allow us to consider the effect of these reform patterns.
5  Reforms and economic growth
We are now ready to regress the annual growth rate, G, on a set of right-hand variables. It
is customary to include contemporaneous and one-year lagged variables on the right-hand
side. To facilitate interpretation, we implement this lag structure by including the contem-
poraneous first difference and the variable lagged one-year. The first difference of a vari-
	
		 
Employing a general-to-specific methodology, we initially enter the following vari-
		 ! "# "# $%$%&
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The lagged growth rate G(–1), the trend variable TREND and the conflict dummy
WAR are mainly control variables, while the policy interest focuses on the terms involving
logarithmic inflation LI and the principal components PC1, …, PC8. In most cases, we
allow for country-specific fixed effects and exclude the variables capturing initial condi-
tions, INI1 and INI2, from the regression.
The highly different growth paths among the countries in the sample may lead to
cross-section heteroskedasticity. Consequently, we perform weighted least squares (WLS)
estimation with cross-section weights derived from residual variances from a first-stage
OLS estimation.
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It is important to appreciate the “reduced form” nature of growth regressions for tran-
sition economies. In the absence of a theoretical foundation, the exercise merely exposes
correlation patterns. Regarding their panel data regressions, Fischer  (1996b, p. 231)
write, “… results should be viewed as a way of describing data, rather than reflecting deep
                                                
16 We avoid use of the term “partial reforms” as it might be confused with the case where the level (or
intensity) of individual reforms is limited.
17 All estimations were performed using Eviews 4.1, except later GMM estimations, which were done with
PcGive 10.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
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structural relations.” This makes it important to test the robustness of the results. Thus, we
later 
	




Even with our rich general specification, a large number of variables are significant at the
10% level (i.e. have numerical -values around or above 1.65): the war dummy, the infla-
tion variables and one or both terms of principal components 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8. The general-
to-specific model selection is implemented by successively eliminating the variable with
the numerically lowest -value to the point where all estimates are significant at the 5%
level. The resulting regression is shown in column (3.1) in Table 3.
Table 3.   Panel data estimations of growth determinants
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The lagged growth rate and the trend variable are both strongly significant with positive
parameters. These variables most likely reflect the contribution of omitted variables in the
regression. However, the significant lagged growth rate may also be interpreted as the re-
sult of slow adjustment to changes in the right-hand side variables. Radulescu & Barlow
(2002) discuss possible interpretations of this trend. Unsurprisingly, the parameter to the
conflict dummy is negative and significant. The parameters to (log) inflation changes and
lagged (log) inflation are precisely estimated and have negative signs.




positive. Broad-based reforms has a short-term cost in form of lower growth the first year,
but are beneficial for growth in the medium term, i.e. from the second year onwards. The
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companying reforms has a negative impact on growth in the short term, but a positive im-
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ing that accelerated large-scale privatisation is bad for growth irrespective time horizon.
The parameter to PC7(–1) is negative, although only marginally significant. Market open-
ing without supporting reforms appears detrimental to growth. Finally, the parameter to
PC8(–1) is also negative, indicating that a policy of early bank liberalisation without enter-
prise reform is likely detrimental to growth.
The first results are standard for the literature (see also the discussion in section 2).
Outbreaks of war and high inflation are bad for growth, while overall broad-based reforms
are good for growth. The new insights are mainly related to the estimates of the effects of
unsynchronised reforms, i.e. the effects of PC2, PC6, PC7 and PC8.
0
Column (3.2) in Table 3 presents the estimates obtained using ordinary pooled least
squares (OLS), instead of WLS. All signs are retained, but the estimate to PC1(–1) has
fallen substantially and the variable is now insignificant.
18 The estimated parameters and
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 $%.$%.$%/	$%'+
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tent. It seems appropriate whenever possible to use WLS.
As discussed earlier, endogeneity problems related to contemporary variables might
  *(   + 	  0( ,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variables LI(–1), PC1(–1), PC2(–1), PC6(–1), PC7(–1) and PC8(–1) have broadly retained
their size and significance. In practice, the endogeneity problem associated with the vari-
ables based on EBRD indices is probably not very serious as the indices are scored in the
middle of the year when little information about the country’s performance is known.
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There is a danger outliers could influence results unduly, particularly the large nega-
tive growth rates registered for a number of CIS countries. For example, output contracted
52.6% in Armenia in 1992! This partly reflects the war in the country at that time, but also




impact on positive growth rate of “normal” size. The findings (not shown) are close to
those in column (3.1), so extreme growth data points are unlikely to drive the results.
                                                
18 The problem of obtaining a precise estimate to PC(–1) will reappear in a number of the specifications used
for robustness checks.
19 A possible endogeneity bias is generally considered small in the literature. Berg et al. (1999) use IMF
targets to instruments specific variables but find no noteworthy differences.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
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Moreover, experiments with transformations of other variables and inclusion of dummies
to pick up outliers also show that the results are reasonably robust.
It is uncommon to include the lagged growth rate on the right-hand side of growth re-
gressions for transition economies.
20 To ensure that our results do not hinge on this specifi-
cation, G(–1) is excluded and the results shown in column (3.4). The main effect is that the
parameter to TREND increases. With the exception of the parameter to PC1(–1), all other
parameters increase somewhat numerically. This result is intuitive and the medium-term
impacts are broadly the same as before as the dynamic effect from the lagged growth rate
is now lacking. Removing the trend also has a negligible impact on the results (not shown).
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the growth equation dropping the
fixed effect dummies and including instead the two variables capturing initial conditions
together with a constant. The results in column (3.5) are close to those in column (3.1)
suggesting that the estimated impact of the reform variables is not a mirage caused by dif-
ferent initial conditions affecting both reform choices and growth results. INI2 is signifi-
cant and has the expected negative sign, while INI1 is positive and insignificant.
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OLS-based estimation methods generally yield biased estimates in dynamic panels
due to correlation between the country-specific fixed effects and the error term. There is
still no consensus on which estimation method to use in this case. The often-used Arellano-
Bond GMM method first eliminates country-specific effects by differencing the equation
and then use lagged values of the  variables as GMM instruments.
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However, GMM estimation like the Arellano-Bond method gives rise to bias in small
samples, in particular, when right-hand side variables are serially correlated. Indeed,
Judson & Owen (1999) show that in a sample with few cross-sections and a short time ho-
rizon the Arellano-Bond method performs no better than the fixed-effect OLS estimator
(although better than standard OLS without fixed effects). Other methods are likely to per-
form better, depending on the structure of data. Beck & Levine (2001) point out that esti-
mates from the Arellano-Bond method could be strongly biased in small-sample dynamic
panels with persistent right-hand side variables. Nerlove (2002) argues that the Arellano-
Bond method is inappropriate in dynamic panels with a short time dimension and examines
the properties of a number of other methods without finding any generally superior esti-
mator. 
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As a robustness check, we estimate the dynamic model with trend using the Arellano-
Bond GMM method. In the first case, we only instrument the lagged growth rate, assuming

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exogeneous. The results using the Arellano-Bond one-step method are presented in column
(3.6). Although some changes occur, the results in (3.6) are broadly consistent with the
results of the WLS estimation in (3.1) and with the OLS estimation in (3.3). (Note that the
Arellano-Bond procedure implies that the sample is reduced one period.)
                                                
20 Berg  (1999) include the lagged growth rate on the right-hand side of the regression, but find that it is
insignificant.
21 The positive sign to INI1 is a bit puzzling as it implies that countries that started reforms with
macroeconomic imbalances and little familiarity with market systems should, 	
	
1grow faster.
Berg  (2001) get the expected negative sign, while Havrylyshyn  (1998) show that when inflation is
included on the right-hand side the sign is often positive Adverse initial distortions in the form of
macroeconomic imbalances and successive inflation are likely to be closely correlated.
22 Instrumentation is required as the error term of the difference equation is still correlated with the left-hand
side variable.
23 This is also reflected in e.g. Pattillo  (2002), where dynamic growth models are estimated. All results
are presented using four different estimation techniques, including GMM.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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eliminate possible endogeneity biases from the contemporaneous right-hand variables.
Again the changes are not dramatic.
The conclusion is that GMM estimation confirms the qualitative results obtained ear-
lier. The estimated standard errors are generally larger for the GMM estimations than for
the OLS/WLS estimations. This problem is to some extent related to the “weak instrument
problem” causing the GMM estimators to be inefficient in small samples.
24 We find, as do
several other studies, that the GMM results are not fundamentally different from least-
squares-based methods. They may, however, suffer from inference problems.
There is trend in some of the variables, in particular, G, LI and PC1 and, thus, poten-
tially a risk that the estimated parameters are influenced by spurious correlation. To ex-
amine this problem, we remove the time trend and add time dummies for every year in the
period 1990-2000 in the basic model in (3.1). The results presented in column (3.8) con-
firm that the model is quite robust. Even with fixed effect dummies, year dummies and
lagged endogenous dummies, all variables retain their sign. As one would expect, the
dummies remove explanatory power from the trended variable PC1(–1), but the sign re-
mains positive.
The risk of spurious correlation is also assessed by detrending the series by subtract-
ing from each variable the yearly average of the variable computed over all countries (ex-
cept for the trend and the conflict dummy). Column (3.9) shows the estimation results with
detrended variables. Again, the specification appears robust.
When the sample is split into two subperiods, some instability is revealed. The esti-
mation results are shown for 1990-95 in column (3.10) and for 1996-2001 in column
(3.11). The estimation results for the early subperiod correspond closely to the full sample
results with the exception of the estimate to PC7(–1), which is positive, albeit insignificant.
For the latter subperiod, a number of changes are noteworthy. First, the parameters to
$%	 $%-,+*)+)
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level. The short-term costs of reforms seem, at most, to be a feature of the early stages of




changes to PC1(–1) and PC2(–1) imply that the effects of the two reform clusters in the 2-4





the late period. In sum, reforms do a better job of explaining growth at the beginning of the
reform period than at the end. A number of studies reach this conclusion, e.g. Radulescu &
Barlow (2002). This is consistent with the view that reforms change the structure of these
economies, likely increasing the importance of traditional growth factors like physical and
human capital accumulation.
The estimations reported employ “calendar time.” Calendar time – as opposed to
“transition time” – is chosen because it gives the longest possible sample, ensures more
variation in both right-hand and left-hand variables and simplifies interpretation in certain
cases. As a robustness check, most of the regressions in this paper have been reestimated
using transition time applying the transformation suggested in Berg  (1999). The re-
sults (not shown) are broadly similar to those reported. The main difference is that the es-
                                                
24 The use of the Arellano-Bond method is not rejected. There is first-order autocorrelation in the residuals in
the differenced model and the Sargan test does not reject the instruments. Nevertheless, the presence of
serially correlated right-hand variables reduces the efficiency of the level instruments. The potential small-
sample bias is an argument for avoiding a general-to-specific specification search using GMM.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:





tional levels. This result is broadly in line with the above finding that the negative and sig-
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The broadly similar results obtained from many specifications suggest that several fairly
robust conclusions can be drawn concerning the relationship between reforms and growth
in transition countries. The control variables offer straightforward interpretations. Conflict
situations impact growth negatively, while the lagged growth rate and a trend always attain
positive signs.
Inflation and increasing inflation are negatively correlated with growth. The contem-
poraneous effect of inflation changes is negative even in the later half of the sample, i.e.
there still appears to be no short-term Phillips curve relationship in the transition econo-
mies.
We find that broad-based reforms, as represented by principal component PC1, are
good for growth in the medium term, while the short-term effect may be negative at the
early stages of reform. The parameter to PC1(–1) has been estimated to values ranging
from 0.22 to 0.73 (and 1.35 in an extremely under-parameterised model). This rather broad
interval of estimates is somewhat inconvenient as PC1 captures the overall reform progress
and different parameter sizes have different implications for the desirability of reforms.
25
Early reforms in the form of liberalisation and small-scale privatisation have a positive
medium-term effect on growth even in the absence of other (mainly structural) reforms.
Liberalisation and small-scale privatisation have a positive growth effect even if structural
reforms are less advanced. The short-term impact of early liberalisation appears to be
negative at the early stages of reform.
A policy of large-scale privatisation and price liberalisation without small-scale priva-
tisation and market opening has a negative impact on growth. The impact is contempora-
neous, as well as medium-term. This result broadly confirms the finding in Zinnes 
(2001) that privatisation without enterprise reforms leads to title change with little restruc-
turing. Broadly similar results follow from the meta-analysis in Djankov & Murrell (2002)
of approximately 100 empirical studies examining restructuring at the enterprise level. Fast
privatisation of large firms with insufficient supporting reforms hold back firm restructur-
ing and growth (see also Havrylyshyn, 2001). Note, however, that the result implies rapid
small-scale privatisation is beneficial to growth even in the absence of large-scale privati-
sation and price liberalisation.
Early market opening without other reforms like small-scale privatisation and enter-
prise restructuring also seems detrimental to growth, at least in the latter part of transition.
Figuratively, one might imagine foreign competition sweeping away domestic state-owned
and unreconstructed producers. Crafts (2000) and IMF (1997) discuss preconditions neces-
sary to ensure that market opening and international integration is beneficial to growth.
Again, the reasoning can be reversed: a policy of small-scale privatisation and enterprise
restructuring appear growth enhancing − even when not backed by market opening.
                                                
25 The result is, however, not inconsistent with previous contributions, which have found a wide range of
estimated parameter values to a broad index of reforms (see discussion in Radulescu & Barlow, 2002).
Radulescu & Barlow (2002) use an extreme bounds analysis and show that the sum of the EBRD indices
does not enter 	 in their growth regressions, i.e. the parameter and the significance of the parameter
depend on other variables being entered in the regressions.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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Finally, bank liberalisation without enterprise restructuring has a negative impact on
growth, especially in the later stages of reform. An example of this might be the Czech
experience in the mid-1990s, when excessive bank lending to non-restructured firms con-
tributed to serious banking sector problems and unsatisfactory growth (see OECD, 1998,
2000). The reverse interpretation is that enterprise restructuring is beneficial even in the
absence of bank liberalisation.
6  Speed of reforms
The speed at which reforms should be introduced and implemented remains a controversial
issue within transition economics. The debate also covers sequencing and reform comple-
mentary, as sequenced reforms may take longer to implement than broad-based reforms.
Sequencing of reforms was considered in section 5, so this section focuses entirely on the
impact on growth of the overall speed with which reforms are implemented (speed 	
).
26
As noted in section 2, an argument for speedy reform exists when the reform level im-
pacts growth positively. Fast reforms would put the country on a higher path early on, al-
lowing the country to enjoy higher growth for a longer period. Why postpone something
that will do you good? In this sense, all estimations presented in section 5 suggest that
broad-based reforms (PC1) or liberalisation (PC2) should be implemented rapidly.
27 How-
ever, as argued in section 2 we are interested in effects on top ofthis level effect.
Testing 
	 for speed effects presents two challenges. We must specify precise
and testable hypotheses, and then derive and implement tests of those hypotheses. Here, we
consider two hypotheses. First, speed effects may affect the level of “pain” resulting from
reforms in the short term. Second, the speed of reforms may affect medium-term growth,
and therefore influence the selection of growth path. The short-term hypothesis is exam-
ined by testing for possible convexity in the short-term reform costs. The medium-term
hypothesis is tested by the construction of variables that capture, respectively, the diver-







The estimations in section 5 implicitly assumed that short-term reform changes affect
growth rates linearly. This assumption implies that the short-term costs of reforms are the
same whether reforms are implemented quickly or done piecemeal over several years.
However, possible convexities in the short-term impact would imply 	
	
 that
the level of transition “pain” might be lower in a slow reform regime.
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26 The speed of reforms is also important for objectives other than growth, e.g. distribution, regional
development and medium-term political sustainability. These issues cannot be addressed in this framework.
27 Naturally, the opposite holds for the unsynchronised reforms of the types captured by PC6, PC7 and PC8.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:






)(<: $%- . The result appears in column (4.3).
Table 4.   Speed effects in panel data estimations of growth determinants
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degree of convexity in the short-term growth costs of broad-based reform and a moderate
degree in the liberalisation term.
The results are obtained in spite of the test being biased 
 detecting non-linear














original specification). We conclude that, although the convex specification yields a
slightly more precise parameter estimate, the difference is not statistically significant. The
same holds for the convex specifica) $%-(
3
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It is expedient to derive a variable that directly reflects the speed of reforms. We construct
a measure based on a suggestion in Berg  (1999). The objective is to calculate the
trend reform level during a fixed time window, and then compare the actual reform level
with the calculated trend value during the early part of the window. The higher the early
reform level is above trend level, the speedier the implementation of reforms.
The implementation speed of broad-based reforms (PC1) is considered within a four-
year window. The reform level in period  = –4 is PC1(–4) and the contemporaneous level
is PC1. Accordingly, the expected trend reform level for any period  in the intervening
period is EPC1() = PC1(–4) + (4 + )·(PC1 – PC1(–4))/4, where  = –4, …, 0. The speed
variable PC1SP is the sum of the differences between actual and trend reform level for
periods  = –3 and  = –2:
PC1SP = [PC1(–3) – EPC1(–3)] + [PC1(–2) – EPC1(–2)]
PC1SP is added to specification (3.1) with the result shown in column (4.4) in Table
4. Note that the sample period has changed as PC1SP absorbs a couple of years. The pa-
rameter to PC1SP is positive, but insignificant.
28 It should be noted, however, that the re-
gression contains many variables, which makes it difficult for PC1SP to attain significance.
The partial correlation between G and PC1SP is positive and highly significant. Still, ex-
perimentation with different samples, non-linear transformations and lagged values of
PC1SP shows no  relationship exists. On the suspicion of asymmetric effects, we
split PC1SP into two variables respectively containing positive and negative values, but the
results (not shown) were again inconclusive. Similar exercises using the liberalisation
cluster (PC2) fail to yield any consistent results.
	
		
Finally, we apply methods derived from Wolf (1999) to test for speed effects. Initially, the
number of years from the start of the reform process (i.e. year 0 using transition time) until





in Table 3) and the exclusion of PC1SP.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
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PC1 has 
	 by 4 is counted.
29 This number (score) would be e.g. 2 for the Czech
Republic and Estonia, 4 for Hungary and Moldova, and 7 for Bulgaria and Croatia. For
some countries, e.g. Belarus and Macedonia, PC1 does not increase by 4 units within the
sample.
The variable YEAR is constructed as follows: For 1989-1997 it contains zeros; for
1998-2001 it contains the speed score provided the score is less than 8, otherwise zero. The
construction of YEAR with zeros until 1998 implies that only medium-term effects of the
speed score are captured and ensures that the measure of reform speed does not impact
growth before reforms are actually implemented.
30
We include YEAR in regression (3.5) with a constant term and controls for initial
conditions. (Fixed effects estimation cannot be used when YEAR is included.) The result is
shown in column (4.5) in Table 4. The estimated parameter is negative and significant,
indicating that reform speed is 

 correlated with growth, i.e. rapid reform is asso-
ciated with higher medium-term growth.
Another test separates the transition countries into three groups. The first group con-
sists of countries undertaking fast reforms (YEAR B 0  
	 * 
 )
countries undertaking gradual reforms (4 BC!B/		*
e-
form-resistant laggards (YEAR D'(	*8!EF)@'@@/	
for 1998-2001 for all countries in the first group. The dummy SLOW has zeros for 1989-
97 and ones for countries in the second group. Column (4.6) in Table 4 shows the result of
adding these two dummy variables to regression (3.5). Both have negative (and significant)
parameters. The parameter to FAST is smaller than to SLOW, which may indicate that
slow reforms were beneficial to growth. However, the Wald test cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that the two parameters are identical.
The method of directly inserting the variables YEAR or FAST and SLOW into the
growth regression did not provide firm evidence on the effect of speed. However, there is




Early reforms allow more years in which the transition country can reap the benefits. Be-
yond this trivial finding, the panel data methodology employed in this paper does not pro-
vide strong arguments for or against rapid reform. The short-term cost of reforms might be
larger when implemented in bulk, but the effect is small and insignificant. The medium-
term growth effects of rapid reform are uncertain, but rapid reforms appear unlikely to
hamper growth. In sum, the  of reforms does not appear to a quantitatively substantial
impact on growth 	 the level effect. This result contradicts the conclusions in
World Bank (1996) and Berg  (1999), but are broadly in line with Wolf (1999).
                                                
29 For a country starting with all reform indices at their lowest level (e.g. most countries emerging from the
Soviet Union), an increase of PC1 equal to 4 signifies that the country is halfway to a well-developed market
economy.
30 It also implies that the variable YEAR only contributes to explaining growth in the last four years of the
sample 1990-2001, i.e. the part of the sample where the other right-hand variables are relative less effective.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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7  Final comments
A novel feature of this paper was the use of principal component clustering of the EBRD
reform indices to infer the structure of reform in transition economies. A cluster of syn-
chronised, broad-based reforms, i.e. liberalisation, privatisation and structural reforms,
covers 79.5% of all variation in the initial EBRD reform indices. A cluster of liberalisation
and small-scale reforms without other reforms explains 7.9% of the variation, while six
other clusters of unsynchronised reforms span the remaining 12.6%.
The growth regressions included the reform clusters, inflation terms and control vari-
ables. As in most other studies, inflation was found to be detrimental to growth. Synchro-
nised, broad-based reforms had a positive impact on growth in the medium term, with a
negative short-term effect at the early stages of reform. Also a policy of liberalisation and
small-scale privatisation without accompanying structural reforms were shown to have a
positive effect (again, with a possible early negative short-term effect). Accelerated large-
scale privatisation without small-scale privatisation and structural reforms were found
likely to harm growth, both in the short and the medium term.
Conversely, small-scale privatisation without large-scale privatisation appears benefi-
cial to growth. A less certain result is that market opening and price liberalisation without
accompanying privatisation and enterprise reforms appear correlated with lower growth,
but this effect stems primarily for the most recent period. Reversing this result, privatisa-
tion and restructuring without market opening may be good for growth. Finally, bank lib-
eralisation without enterprise restructuring might be harmful, while enterprise reforms
without bank liberalisation may increase growth.
Effects from the speed of reforms are mostly absent, with the exception that early re-
forms leave the transition country a longer period in which to reap the benefits of reforms.
Possible negative short-term effects of rapid reforms are likely to be modest, and could be
balanced by possible positive medium-term effects. The broad overall conclusion is that
speed 	 has no discernible impact on growth.
Finally, what can we now say about the three questions raised in the introduction?
First, the analysis revealed a complex pattern of reform 	

 with notable
implications for the sequencing of reforms. Balanced, wide-ranging reforms based on si-
multaneous progress in liberalisation, privatisation and structural reforms are favourable to
growth, and hence suggest a mutually reinforcing effect of various reform elements.
Liberalisation combined with small-scale privatisation is beneficial even in the ab-
sence of other reforms. In this case, unsynchronised reforms produce positive growth ef-
fects. Thus, liberalisation and small-scale privatisation are not 	 complementary to
deeper reforms such as large-scale privatisation and structural reforms. A sequenced re-
form policy that stresses liberalisation and small-scale privatisation is beneficial. Early,
“easy” reforms should therefore not be postponed in the absence of a comprehensive re-
form strategy.
A number of unsynchronised reform packages proved detrimental to growth. Se-
quenced policy packages involving large-scale privatisation without small-scale privatisa-
tion, market opening without accompanying reforms, and bank liberalisation without en-
terprise restructuring lead to lower growth in the short and/or medium term. Conversely, a
“reversal” of the policy mix would produce packages beneficial to growth. In sum, the sta-
tistically significant parameters to a number of unsynchronised reform clusters support the
view that reforms need to be fine-tuned to take into account complex interactions among
reforms.Karsten Staehr Reforms and economic growth in transition economies:
Complementarity, sequencing and speed
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Second, we asked $
reforms are of foremost importance. Within the set of vari-
ables used in this paper and using a broad brush, a number of variables stand out. Inflation
stabilisation repeatedly proved important. Price liberalisation, small-scale privatisation,
enterprise restructuring (and to a lesser degree trade opening) were generally important in
many different combinations with other reforms. Large-scale privatisation, financial sector
reforms and market regulation mainly proved beneficial when they were part of a larger,
more comprehensive reform packages.
31 These results seem to support the view that re-
form 

 are crucial − even countries that fail to attempt deep structural changes can
gain from reforms. These findings are broadly in line with the findings in Havrylyshyn &
van Rooden (2000). As a caveat, we note that only a few variables included in our analysis
reflect currently popular themes such as institutional quality and social capital.
Third, the finding that speed 	is of little importance for growth seems to favour
relatively rapid implementation of reforms due to the level effect. However, this finding
also implies there is no direct loss from slowing reforms when it is necessary to get content
or sequencing right.
These results will probably disappoint supporters of both big-bang and gradualism, as
they provide no unequivocal support for either view. If it is any consolation to the gradu-
alists, reform sequencing appears to be important, and reforms should preferably progress
synchronously. Certain sequenced reform paths are clearly counterproductive. Likewise,
for the big-bang supporters, initial phase reforms are beneficial, even in the absence of
deeper reforms. Moreover, fast reforms appear generally beneficial. Thus, there is no clear-
cut transition strategy that provides the best results for countries endeavouring to convert a
centrally planned economy into a market economy. There are only policy choices − some
better than others − and certain strategies that should be avoided.
                                                
31 Note that the sample is short. We only test for short-term (first year) and medium-term (from second year)
effects. The analysis does not rule out the possibility that large-scale privatisation, financial sector reforms or
market regulation individually might have positive effects in the longer term.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 1/2003
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